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Abstract
Multi-agent consensus under jamming attacks is investigated. Specifically, inter-agent communications over a network are assumed to
fail at certain times due to jamming of transmissions by a malicious attacker. A new stochastic communication protocol is proposed
to achieve finite-time practical consensus between agents. In this protocol, communication attempt times of agents are randomized and
unknown by the attacker until after the agents make their communication attempts. Through a probabilistic analysis, we show that the
proposed communication protocol, when combined with a stochastic ternary control law, allows agents to achieve consensus regardless
of the frequency of attacks. We demonstrate the efficacy of our results by considering two different strategies of the jamming attacker: a
deterministic attack strategy and a more malicious communication-aware attack strategy.
Key words: Jamming attacks, randomized methods, multi-agent consensus
1 Introduction
Nowadays, control systems heavily utilize information and
communication technologies. Especially, the Internet of
Things is becoming widespread and remote sensing/control
operations can now take place over wireless networks. With
these new developments, the risk of cyber attacks against
control systems is also increasing. Communication chan-
nels used in control systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks
and ensuring cyber security of control systems has become
a very important challenge (Sandberg et al., 2015).
Networked control systems are threatened by different types
of cyber attacks. For instance, on a vulnerable network, mea-
surement and control data can be altered by a malicious at-
tacker (Fawzi et al., 2014). In certain situations, attackers
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can even inject false data into the system without being no-
ticed (Mo et al., 2010). These attacks require the attacker to
be knowledgeable about the system dynamics. In the context
of multi-agent systems, the presence of faulty or even mali-
cious agents not following the given protocols may affect the
global behavior of the overall system. There is a rich history
in computer science on the development of resilient consen-
sus algorithms (e.g., Lynch (1996), Azadmanesh and Kieck-
hafer (2002)). Recently, this problem has gained interest in
systems and control as well (LeBlanc et al., 2013; Tseng and
Vaidya, 2015; Dibaji et al., 2018; Dibaji and Ishii, 2017).
On the other hand, attackers who have limited informa-
tion about the control system can resort to denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks to prevent communication over networks. For
instance, malicious routers in a network may intentionally
drop measurement and control data (Awerbuch et al., 2008;
Mahmoud and Shen, 2014). Moreover, denial-of-service on
wireless networks can also happen in the form of jamming
attacks. A jamming attacker can block the transmissions on a
wireless channel by emitting strong interference signals (Xu
et al., 2005; Pelechrinis et al., 2011). Recently, researchers
explored the effect of jamming and other types of denial-of-
service attacks on networked control systems (De Persis and
Tesi, 2016; Shisheh-Foroush and Martínez, 2016; Cetinkaya
et al., 2017; Feng and Tesi, 2017; Cetinkaya et al., 2019;
Cetinkaya et al., 2018). Moreover, the effect of jamming on
Preprint submitted to Automatica December 5, 2019
multi-agent consensus has also been explored (Senejohnny
et al., 2015; Senejohnny et al., 2017).
One of the main challenges in studying the multi-agent con-
sensus problem under jamming attacks is that the attacker’s
actions cannot be known a priori. To account for the uncer-
tainty in the generation of attacks, the works (Senejohnny et
al., 2015; Senejohnny et al., 2017) characterized jamming
attacks through their average duration and frequency. It is
shown there that multi-agent consensus can be achieved if
the duration and the frequency of attacks satisfy certain con-
ditions. Specifically, these works consider a self-triggered
control framework, where each agent attempts to commu-
nicate with its neighbors and update its local control input
only when a triggering condition is satisfied. For consensus,
it is required that the ratio of the duration of the attacks to
the total time is less than one. This ensures that the jam-
ming does not span the entire time. Note that under the self-
triggering framework, the communication attempt times for
the agents are deterministic. Thus, an attacker who is knowl-
edgeable on the multi-agent system can determine those time
instants. This allows the attacker to block the communica-
tion by turning on the jamming attack very briefly at those
instants without violating the duration condition. To avoid
this issue, a restriction on the attack frequency becomes nec-
essary. Specifically, the frequency of the attacks is required
to be less than the frequency of the communication attempts
by the agents.
Motivated by the discussion above, our goal in this paper is
to investigate attack scenarios where the jamming is turned
on and off very frequently. Our main contribution is a new
stochastic consensus framework to deal with those attack
scenarios. In our framework, we use the ternary control laws
previously used in (De Persis and Frasca, 2013; Senejohnny
et al., 2015; Senejohnny et al., 2017). However, instead of
the self-triggering method utilized in those works, we pro-
pose a stochastic communication protocol that can achieve
consensus regardless of the frequency of the attacks. In this
protocol, each agent attempts to communicate with its neigh-
bors at random time instants. These time instants are hence
unknown by the attacker.
We consider two attack strategies that are restricted by their
average duration but not by their frequency. In the first strat-
egy, the starting time and the duration of the jamming attacks
are deterministic and do not depend on whether the agents
try to communicate. On the other hand, in the second strat-
egy the attacker is aware of the communication attempts of
the agents and can preserve energy by turning off jamming
right after a communication attempt is blocked. We show
that in both strategies, our proposed stochastic communica-
tion protocol guarantees infinitely many successful commu-
nications in the long run. Furthermore, by using a proba-
bilistic analysis, we show that almost-sure finite-time prac-
tical consensus is achieved regardless of attack frequency
as long as the average ratio of attack durations is less than
hundred-percent.
Our approach for analyzing the consensus under jamming
differs largely from those in the literature. In particular,
for the deterministic communication strategy proposed in
(Senejohnny et al., 2015; Senejohnny et al., 2017), bounds
on attack frequency can be used for establishing an upper-
bound for the interval between two consecutive successful
communication times of an agent. Here in this paper, such
an upper-bound is not available and there is a positive prob-
ability that any finite number of consecutive communication
attempts can be blocked by a jamming attacker. This dif-
ference is due to the fact that we do not consider a bound
for attack frequencies and our communication protocol in-
volves randomization of transmission times. We also note
that although there are several works that deal with random
connectivity issues and randomly switching graph topolo-
gies in multi-agent systems (e.g., Tahbaz-Salehi and Jad-
babaie (2010), Zhang and Tian (2010), You et al. (2013)),
the analysis techniques in this paper are completely different
from those works due to our approach of intentionally ran-
domizing the inter-agent communication times to mitigate
jamming attacks which occur at uncertain times.
Our analysis for consensus relies on first establishing that un-
der randomized transmissions, all agents can communicate
with their neighbors infinitely many times in the long run.
This is shown for the deterministic and the communication-
aware attacks using different techniques. In the case of de-
terministic attacks, the independence of attacks and com-
munication attempts plays an important role. Another big
role is played by the uniform distribution of random com-
munication attempt times. On the other hand, in the case
of communication-aware attacks, the timing of attacks de-
pends on all previous history of the communication times of
agents. In the analysis of this case, we construct a filtration
that represents the progression of the actions of the agents
and those of the attacker. By utilizing this filtration, we
show that our protocol can achieve a positive probability of
at least one successful inter-agent transmission during care-
fully selected sufficiently long intervals spanning the time
domain. We then utilize the monotone-convergence theorem
for sets to show that even in communication-aware attacks,
each agent can make infinitely many successful communi-
cations in the long run. This result allows us to show that
with suitable choice of control parameters, each agent would
be able to select appropriate control actions and apply them
long enough to reach consensus in finite time.
In this paper, we show that randomization in inter-agent
communications enables agents to reach consensus regard-
less of the frequency of jamming attacks. In recent works,
randomization in communication has been exploited in dif-
ferent ways. For instance, randomized gossip algorithms is
used in Boyd et al. (2006) to allow networked operation un-
der limited computation and communication resources. Fur-
thermore, the work by Dibaji et al. (2018) introduced ran-
domness in quantization as well as in communication times
to increase resiliency against malicious nodes in multi-agent
systems. Such advantages of using probabilistic methods
have been found in resilient consensus in computer science
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and are often referred to as "impossibility results" (e.g.,
Lynch (1996)). In addition, random frequency hopping tech-
niques are utilized by Navda et al. (2007) and Pöpper et al.
(2010) to mitigate jamming in wireless networks.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain
the multi-agent consensus problem under jamming attacks.
We propose a stochastic communication protocol and pro-
vide conditions for consensus under jamming attacks in Sec-
tion 3. Then we discuss our protocol’s efficacy under deter-
ministic and communication-aware attacks in Section 4. In
Section 5, we present numerical examples to demonstrate
our results. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
We note that part of the results in Sections 3 and 4 ap-
peared in our preliminary report (Kikuchi et al., 2017) with-
out proofs. In this paper, we provide complete proofs and
more detailed discussions in Sections 3 and 4. Furthermore,
new numerical examples are presented in Section 5.
The notation used in the paper is fairly standard. Specifically,
we denote positive and nonnegative integers by N and N0,
respectively. Furthermore, we use (·)T to denote transpose,
|S| to denote the Lebesgue measure of a set S ⊂ R, and
A\B to denote the set of elements that belong to set A, but
not to set B. The notations P[·] and E[·] respectively denote
the probability and the expectation on a probability space
(Ω,F ,P). Moreover, we use 1[E] : Ω → {0, 1} for the
indicator of the event E ∈ F , that is, 1[E](ω) = 1, ω ∈ E,
and 1[E](ω) = 0, ω /∈ E. To simplify the presentation, we
omit the ω ∈ Ω in the notation of random variables in certain
equations.
2 Multi-Agent Consensus Under Jamming Attacks
In this paper, we investigate the consensus problem for a
multi-agent system composed of n agents with scalar dy-
namics. The communication topology of the multi-agent
system is represented by an undirected connected graph
G = (V , E), where V = {1, . . . , n} represents the set of
nodes corresponding to the n agents, and E ⊂ V × V is the
set of edges corresponding to the communication links be-
tween the agents. Let Ni be the set of neighbors and di be
the degree of node i. We use L ∈ Rn×n to denote the Lapla-
cian matrix associated with G. Note that L is a symmetric
matrix since G is an undirected graph.
The evolution of the states of the multi-agent system is char-
acterized through the scalar dynamics
x˙i(t) = ui(t), t ≥ 0, (1)
where xi(t) and ui(t) respectively denote the state and the
local control input for agent i.
In this paper we design a piecewise-constant control input
ui(t) for each agent i, as well as a protocol for the commu-
Figure 1. Communication attempt times of 3 agents represented
with {tik}k∈N0 , i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, together with the jamming attacks
represented with {ak}k∈N0 and {τk}k∈N0 .
nication between the agents so that the agents achieve prac-
tical consensus, that is, x(t) , [ x1(t) x2(t) · · · xn(t) ]T
representing the agent states converges in finite time to a
vector x∗ ∈ Rn belonging to the approximate consensus set
Dε with ε > 0 given by
Dε ,
{
x ∈ Rn :
∣∣∣ ∑
j∈Ni
(xj − xi)
∣∣∣ < ε, i ∈ V}. (2)
In what follows we first discuss the jamming attacks on the
communication channels between the agents, and then we
explain our proposed control and communication protocols
for achieving consensus under jamming.
2.1 Jamming Attacks
We consider scenarios where the communication channels
between the agents are disabled by a jamming attacker.
Specifically, we assume that when there is a jamming attack,
communication on all links E fail. This setup allows us to
model attacks on a shared network that the agents use for
communication.We note that the results presented in the pa-
per can also be extended with small modifications to more
general cases where the communication links are attacked
individually by multiple attackers.
We follow the approach of De Persis and Tesi (2016), Sene-
johnny et al. (2015), Senejohnny et al. (2017) and use the
sequences {ak ≥ 0}k∈N0 and {τk ≥ 0}k∈N0 to characterize
the starting time instants and durations of the sequence of
attacks, respectively. Specifically, ak represents the starting
time instant for the kth attack, and τk represents its dura-
tion. For each k ∈ N0, these scalars are assumed to satisfy
ak+1 > ak + τk (see the time sequence at the bottom of
Figure 1).
Now, let Ak , [ak, ak + τk] denote the kth attack interval
(or instant if τk = 0), during which the attacker prevents all
transmissions on the communication channels between the
agents. For any time interval [τ, t] ⊂ [0,∞), we use A(τ, t)
to denote the set of times under jamming attacks, that is,
A(τ, t) , ∪k∈N0Ak ∩ [τ, t]. (3)
Furthermore, for the same interval [τ, t], A
c
(τ, t) denotes
the complement of A(τ, t) in the sense that it is the set of
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times where there is no attack, that is,
A
c
(τ, t) , [τ, t] \ A(τ, t). (4)
Conducting jamming attacks requires energy for transmit-
ting interfering radio signals (Xu et al., 2005). Thus, an at-
tacker with limited resources would not be able to continu-
ously jam the communication channels for a long time. In
such cases, the attacker may repeat cycles of jamming and
idling to preserve energy. The following assumption from
Senejohnny et al. (2015) provides a characterization of the
duration of jamming for various attack scenarios.
Assumption 2.1. There exist κ ≥ 0 and ρ ∈ (0, 1) such
that for each τ ≥ 0 and t ≥ τ ,
|A(τ, t)| ≤ κ+ ρ(t− τ), (5)
where |A(τ, t)| represents the total duration of the attacks
in the interval [τ, t].
Notice that (5) implies lim supt→∞ |A(0, t)|/t ≤ ρ. As a
consequence, the scalar ρ ∈ (0, 1) can be considered as an
upper-bound on the ratio of the duration of attacks in long
intervals, and it is related to the average energy used by
the attacker. Under Assumption 2.1, jamming attacks are
allowed to start at arbitrary time instants as long as (5) holds.
Note also that the longest duration for continuous jamming
allowed under Assumption 2.1 can be obtained as κ/(1−ρ).
Here, the scalar κ can be selected to model the attacker’s
capabilities for continuous jamming.
2.2 Stochastic Ternary Control
To achieve consensus we employ the ternary control ap-
proach previously used in De Persis and Frasca (2013), Sene-
johnny et al. (2015), Senejohnny et al. (2017). However, in-
stead of the self-triggering method utilized in those studies,
we propose a stochastic communication protocol. In what
follows, we first explain the control framework. We then
discuss our communication protocol in detail in Section 3.
Each agent i ∈ V attempts communicating with its neigh-
bors Ni at times tik ≥ 0, k ∈ N0. In particular, at a com-
munication attempt time tik, agent i sends an information
request to all of its neighbors and asks for their states. If
there is no jamming at time tik, then the neighbors of agent
i receive the request and send back their states, which will
be used in the update of agent i’s local control input. In
the case where there is a jamming attack at time tik, agent i
cannot send/receive information.
We use ϕik ∈ {0, 1} to indicate whether the communication
attempt at time tik is successful or not. In particular, ϕ
i
k = 0
indicates a failure at time tik due to a jamming attack, and
ϕik = 1 implies that agent i successfully communicates with
its neighbors at time tik. Observe that
ϕik = 1[t
i
k ∈ A
c
(0, tik)], k ∈ N0. (6)
In this paper communication attempt times tik are random
variables, and consequently, ϕik are also random variables.
Now, let avei(t) ,
∑
j∈Ni
(xj(t) − xi(t)) and signε:
R→ {−1, 0, 1} be defined by
signε(z) ,
{
sign(z), if |z| ≥ ε,
0, otherwise,
with ε > 0 given in (2).
In our framework, agent i attempts to communicate with
its neighbors at time tik to compute signε(ave
i(tik)). Notice
that signε(ave
i(tik)) is a ternary indicator of the location
of neighboring agents’ states with respect to agent i’s own
state. Let
u˜ik ,
{
signε(ave
i(tik)), if ϕ
i
k = 1,
0, otherwise,
k ∈ N0. (7)
Notice that u˜ik = ϕ
i
ksignε(ave
i(tik)). Hence, u˜
i
k 6= 0 implies
ϕik = 1 (i.e., agent i successfully communicates with its
neighbors at time tik) and signε(ave
i(tik)) ∈ {−1, 1} (i.e.,
|avei(tik)| ≥ ε). Now, let uˆ
i
k , u˜
i
k for k = 0 and
uˆik ,

u˜ik, if u˜
i
k 6= 0,
u˜ik−1, if u˜
i
k = 0 and t
i
k < t
i
k−1 + T
i,
0, if u˜ik = 0 and t
i
k ≥ t
i
k−1 + T
i,
(8)
for k ∈ N, where T i > 0. The scalar uˆik denotes the control
input to be applied after time tik.
To understand how the control input value is decided, we
consider a few cases. First, if the communication attempt at
time tik is successful, then u˜
i
k = signε(ave
i(tik)), otherwise
u˜ik = 0. If u˜
i
k 6= 0 (or equivalently if u˜
i
k ∈ {−1, 1}), then
the control input value is set as uˆik = u˜
i
k. On the other hand,
if u˜ik = 0 and the times t
i
k and t
i
k−1 are sufficiently close so
that tik < t
i
k−1+T
i, then u˜ik−1 is applied as a control input
(i.e., uˆik = u˜
i
k−1). Otherwise, if u˜
i
k = 0 and t
i
k ≥ t
i
k−1+T
i,
then the control input is set to uˆik = 0.
The control input uˆik is applied during the interval [t
i
k, tˆ
i
k),
where tˆik , min{t
i
k+1, t˜
i
k} with t˜
i
k , t
i
k+T
i for k = 0, and
t˜ik ,

tik + T
i, if u˜ik 6= 0,
tik−1 + T
i, if u˜ik = 0 and t
i
k < t
i
k−1 + T
i,
tik + T
i, if u˜ik = 0 and t
i
k ≥ t
i
k−1 + T
i,
(9)
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Figure 2. Control input trajectory of agent 2 versus time. Jamming
attack intervals are denoted with shaded (pink) regions.
for k ∈ N. Thus, the continuous-time control input ui(t) for
each agent i is given by ui(t) = 0 for t ∈ [0, ti0), and
ui(t) ,
{
uˆik, t ∈ [t
i
k, tˆ
i
k),
0, t ∈ [tˆik, t
i
k+1),
k ∈ N0. (10)
As we will discuss in the following sections, the scalar T i >
0 and the communication attempt time instants ti0, t
i
1, . . . in
our framework are selected to satisfy tik + T
i < tik+2 for
every k ∈ N0. Notice that at time tik, the control input is set to
either one of the values signε(ave
i(tik)), signε(ave
i(tik−1)),
or 0, depending on the status of the communication attempts
at tik and t
i
k−1. Moreover, this control input is applied until
time tˆik = min{t
i
k+1, t˜
i
k}. In cases where t˜
i
k < t
i
k+1, the
control input is set to zero at t˜ik until the next communication
attempt time tik+1. Furthermore, in the cases where t
i
k+1 <
t˜ik, agent i first attempts a communication with its neighbors
at time tik+1, and then updates the control input based on
(10) with k replaced by k + 1.
In our approach, communication attempt time instants are
random variables with certain distributions and their values
are selected by the agents using random number generators.
In particular, for each agent i, the first communication at-
tempt time ti0 can be selected at time 0. Moreover, for each
k, the communication attempt time tik+1 can be selected at
time tk. Clearly, agent i can check if t = t
i
k+1 at each time
t > tik. The control input can thus be updated following
the description in (10). Notice that in certain cases, agent i
keeps the same control input that is set at time tik even after
time tik+1. This happens if the previous successful commu-
nication time tik is sufficiently close to t
i
k+1 and u˜
i
k+1 = 0
(i.e., ϕik+1signε(ave
i(tik+1)) = 0). In such cases, we have
u(t) = uˆik+1 = u˜
i
k = signε(ave
i(tik)) for t ∈ [t
i
k+1, tˆ
i
k+1)
with tˆik+1 = t
i
k + T
i, which indicates that the control input
signε(ave
i(tik)) is used until t
i
k + T
i (which is after tik+1).
Example 2.2. In Figure 2, we show an example trajectory
for the control input u2(t) of agent 2. In this example, we
have ϕ20 = ϕ
2
2 = ϕ
2
3 = ϕ
2
4 = 1 indicating that communi-
cation attempts at times t20, t
2
2, t
2
3, t
2
4 are not attacked and
thus successful. For this example scenario, at the successful
communication time t22, agent 2 sets its control input to 1
based on the neighbor agents’ states. This control input is
then applied until time t23, at which another successful com-
munication is made and the control input value is changed
to −1. The new control input value is kept constant until
time t23 + T
2 and set to zero at that time.
In our control approach, if agent i makes a successful com-
munication at time tik and sets a nonzero control input, then
this input is kept constant at most until time tik + T
i. If no
new successful communication is made until that time, the
control input is switched to zero at time tik+T
i. If a success-
ful communication is made before (i.e., tik+1 < t
i
k+T
i) and
|avei(tik+1)| ≥ ε, then the control input value is set at time
tik+1 to u˜
i
k+1 = signε(ave
i(tik+1)). In the example scenario
depicted in Figure 2, the nonzero control inputs that are set
at instants t20, t
2
3, and t
2
4 are applied for T
2 units of time. The
control input is switched to zero at times t20 + T
2, t23 + T
2,
and t24 + T
2, since no new successful communication at-
tempts yielding new nonzero control inputs are made during
the intervals [t20, t
2
0 + T
2), [t23, t
2
3 + T
2), and [t24, t
2
4 + T
2).
To achieve consensus under the control law (10), it is im-
portant to design the times tik, k ∈ N0, i ∈ V , at which the
agents attempt to communicate with each other. In this pa-
per, we take a stochastic approach and design these times in
Section 3 as random variables.
Remark 2.3. In Senejohnny et al. (2015), the communi-
cation attempt times tik, k ∈ N0, i ∈ V , are determined
based on a deterministic self-triggering approach. There, the
minimum interval between consecutive communication at-
tempts for each agent is given by ∆∗ > 0. It is observed in
(Senejohnny et al., 2015) that if the attacker is allowed to
attack at a frequency larger than the maximum frequency of
communication attempts (given by 1∆∗ ), then all communi-
cation may be blocked even if Assumption 2.1 is satisfied.
This is because as tik are deterministic times, an attacker
that is knowledgeable on how tik are decided may be able to
generate a strategy to pinpoint tik with attacks of very short
durations and preserve energy for the rest of the time. To
avoid this problem, Senejohnny et al. (2015) considers the
additional assumption that there exist η ≥ 0 and σ < 1∆∗
such that
I(τ, t) ≤ η + σ(t − τ), (11)
for all τ ≥ 0 and t ≥ τ , where I(τ, t) ∈ N0 denotes the
number of attack intervals An in the time frame [τ, t]. The
scalar σ > 0 in (11) represents an upper-bound on the attack
frequency in the long run. Note that since σ < 1∆∗ , the
assumption (11) guarantees that the attack frequency in large
time frames is smaller than the frequency of communication
attempts. By utilizing ρ from (5) and σ from (11), the main
result in (Senejohnny et al., 2015) shows that consensus is
achieved if
ρ+ σ∆∗ < 1. (12)
In the following section, we propose a stochastic commu-
nication protocol, where communication attempt times tik,
k ∈ N0, i ∈ V , are decided randomly. We show that in this
case even if (11) and (12) are not satisfied due to high fre-
quency attacks, consensus can still be achieved.
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3 Stochastic Communication Protocol for Consensus
Under Jamming Attacks
3.1 Stochastic Communication Protocol
We propose a communication protocol where each agent
attempts to communicate with its neighbors at random times
that are unknown to the attacker until the agents attempt
communication at those times.
Definition 3.1 (Stochastic communication protocol). For
each agent i ∈ V , let ∆i > 0 be a fixed scalar, and set tik,
k ∈ N0, to be independent random variables such that tik
has uniform distribution on the interval [k∆i, (k + 1)∆i).
In this communication protocol, each agent i attempts to
make transmission to its neighbors once in every ∆i pe-
riod. The communication attempt time tik for the interval
[k∆i, (k+1)∆i) is selected randomly at time k∆i by agent
i. Due to uniform distribution of tik, k ∈ N0, we have
E[tik+1−t
i
k] = ∆
i, that is, the duration between consecutive
communication attempts are ∆i in expectation. However,
note that tik+1 − t
i
k 6= ∆
i, almost surely. We remark that
the attacker is allowed to know how tik is distributed, but
not the value of tik until the communication is attempted. In
the example of Figure 1 with 3 agents, the attacker is able
to block the first communication attempts of agents 1 and
3. However, the first attempt of agent 2 is successful. Thus,
for this example, ϕ10 = ϕ
3
0 = 0 and ϕ
2
0 = 1.
3.2 Finite-Time Consensus Analysis
In the ternary control approach, the speed of change in each
agent’s state is at most 1. Therefore, agents need to apply
the ternary control input to their dynamics for sufficiently
long durations to get closer to their neighbors. Notice that
the duration of control input application is affected by the
number of successful communication attempts. In particular,
it is likely that an agent i would apply control input to its
dynamics for a longer duration in total, if that agent makes
many successful communications with its neighbors.
As we characterize in the control law (7)–(10), for each
k ∈ N0 with ϕik = 1 and |ave
i(tik)| ≥ ε, the control input
for agent i is set to a nonzero value at time tik. As a pre-
liminary discussion before our consensus analysis in The-
orem 3.3 below, we first investigate the duration for which
this nonzero control input is applied to agent i’s dynamics.
To this end we define θik, k ∈ N0, by
θik ,
{
tik+1 − t
i
k, if t
i
k+1 − t
i
k < T
i and u˜ik+1 6= 0,
T i, otherwise.
(13)
It follows from (7)–(10) that for each k ∈ N0 with
ϕik = 1 and |ave
i(tik)| ≥ ε, the control input uˆ
i
k = u˜
i
k =
signε(ave
i(tik)) is applied for θ
i
k units of time after t
i
k. The
applied control input is either 1 or −1 depending on the
states of agent i and its neighbors at time tik. Notice that the
selected control input does not change during the interval
[tik, t
i
k+θ
i
k). We also note that θ
i
k is used for consensus anal-
ysis and its knowledge is not required for control purposes.
The scalar θik is always upper-bounded by the constant T
i >
0 in (13). In fact θik can either be t
i
k+1−t
i
k or T
i, and the first
case where θik = t
i
k+1− t
i
k happens only if the next commu-
nication attempt time tik+1 is close to t
i
k so that t
i
k+1− t
i
k <
T i. To explain this case, we first consider a successful com-
munication time instant tik with |ave
i(tik)| ≥ ε. Notice that
ϕik = 1 and signε(ave
i(tik)) 6= 0, and therefore, the control
input is set to a nonzero value at tik (e.g., t
2
2 in Figure 2). The
next communication is attempted at time tik+1. If the com-
munication attempt at tik+1 is successful (i.e.,ϕ
i
k+1 = 1) and
the neighboring agents’ states are sufficiently far from agent
i’s state such that |avei(tik+1)| ≥ ε, then u˜
i
k+1 6= 0, and thus
the control input is updated to u˜ik+1 at time t
i
k+1 (e.g., t
2
3 in
Figure 2). If the communication attempt at time tik+1 fails
(i.e., ϕik+1 = 0) or |ave
i(tik+1)| < ε, then θ
i
k = T
i and the
control input is unchanged until time tik + T
i. In the case
where tik+1−t
i
k < T
i, if ϕik+1 = 0 or |ave
i(tik+1)| < ε, then
we have uˆk+1 = u˜k = signε(ave
i(tik)) by (7) and (8), and
moreover, it follows from (9) that tˆik+1 = min{t
i
k+2, t˜
i
k+1}
with t˜ik+1 = t
i
k + T
i.
By using properties of θik, we obtain the following key re-
sult, which establishes intervals in which the control input
is guaranteed to be nonzero.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose T i ∈ (0,∆i). Then, for every k ∈ N0
such that ϕik = 1 and |ave
i(tik)| ≥ ε, we have
|ui(t)| = 1, t ∈ [tik, t
i
k + T
i). (14)
Proof. By (7)–(10) and (13), we have
|ui(t)| = 1, t ∈ [tik, t
i
k + θ
i
k). (15)
Notice that the value of θik can either be T
i or tik+1 − t
i
k. If
θik = T
i, then (15) implies (14).
On the other hand, if θik = t
i
k+1 − t
i
k, then we have
|ui(t)| = 1, t ∈ [tik, t
i
k+1). (16)
Moreover, (13) indicates that the case θik = t
i
k+1 − t
i
k hap-
pens when tik+1− t
i
k ≤ T
i and u˜ik+1 6= 0. In this case, since
u˜ik+1 6= 0, it follows from (8)–(10) and (13) that
|ui(t)| = 1, t ∈ [tik+1, t
i
k+1 + θ
i
k+1). (17)
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Now, as a consequence of (16) and (17), we get
|ui(t)| = 1, t ∈ [tik, t
i
k+1 + θ
i
k+1). (18)
Furthermore, since tik+1 ≥ t
i
k and t
i
k+2 − t
i
k ≥ ∆
i,
tik+1 + θ
i
k+1 ≥ t
i
k+1 +min{t
i
k+2 − t
i
k+1, T
i}
= min{tik+2, t
i
k+1 + T
i} ≥ min{tik +∆
i, tik + T
i}.
Using this inequality together with T i < ∆i, we obtain
tik+1+ θ
i
k+1 ≥ t
i
k +T
i. Hence, (14) follows from (18).
We are ready to present the first main result of this paper. The
theorem below provides conditions under which the multi-
agent system (1), (10) achieves consensus. In particular, they
are given in terms of T i of the control law, as well as ∆i
and ϕik, associated with the communication protocol.
Theorem3.3. Consider themulti-agent system (1), (10)with
T i ∈ (0,min{ ε2di ,∆
i}) where ε > 0. Assume that under
the stochastic communication protocol, it holds
P
[ ∞∑
k=0
ϕik ≥M
]
= 1, (19)
for all M ∈ N0 and i ∈ V . Then x(t) converges in finite
time to a vector x∗ ∈ Rn belonging to the set Dε given by
(2), almost surely.
Proof. First, for each i ∈ V , let Ki , {k ∈ N0 : ϕ
i
k =
1, |avei(tik)| ≥ ε} and T
i ,
⋃
k∈Ki [t
i
k, t
i
k + θ
i
k). Notice
that for a given k ∈ Ki, the time tik corresponds to a suc-
cessful communication attempt time of agent i for which
|avei(tik)| ≥ ε. Thus, T
i represents the union of all nonzero
control input application intervals after successful commu-
nication attempts of agent i.
Now, for t ∈ T i, let pii(t) , max{tik : t
i
k ≤ t, k ∈ K
i}.
Here, pii(t) corresponds to the agent i’s last successful
communication attempt time tik before time t such that
|avei(tik)| ≥ ε. Furthermore, let
W(t) , {i ∈ V : t ∈ T i}, t ≥ 0. (20)
Observe thatW(t) corresponds to the set of agents that have
a nonzero control input ui(t) at time t.
Now, let V (x) , (1/2)xTLx, x ∈ Rn. By (1) and (10),
V˙ (x(t)) = xT(t)Lu(t)
= −
∑
i∈W(t)
avei(t)signε(ave
i(pii(t))), (21)
for t ≥ 0, where u(t) , [ u1(t) u2(t) · · · un(t) ]T.
Our next goal is to show avei(t)signε(ave
i(pii(t))) =
|avei(t)|, i ∈ W(t). To this end, we need to show that
signε(ave
i(pii(t))) = sign(avei(t)), i ∈ W(t). To show
this equivalence, we utilize an important property of ternary
control law. Specifically, in the interval [pii(t), t], the state
of an agent j ∈ V can change by at most t − pii, that is,
xj(t) ∈ [xj(pii(t)) − (t − pii), xj(pii(t)) + (t − pii)]. By
using this property and noting that agent i has di number
of neighbors, we obtain that if avei(pii(t)) ≥ ε, then∑
j∈Ni
(xj(t)− xi(t))
≥
∑
j∈Ni
(
xj(pii(t))− (t− pii)− (xi(pii(t)) + (t− pii))
)
= avei(pii(t)) − 2di(t− pii(t)) ≥ ε− 2di(t− pii(t)).
(22)
Since t ∈ T i for i ∈ W(t) and θik ≤ T
i for k ∈ N0, we
have t − pii(t) < T i. Furthermore, since T i < ε/2di, we
have t− pii(t) < ε/2di. Hence, it follows from (22) that if
avei(pii(t)) ≥ ε, then∑
j∈Ni
(xj(t)− xi(t)) > ε− 2di
ε
2di
= 0. (23)
Similarly, we can show that if avei(pii(t)) ≤ −ε, then∑
j∈Ni
(xj(t)− xi(t)) < −(ε− 2di
ε
2di
) = 0. (24)
Noting that |avei(pii(t))| ≥ ε for i ∈ W(t), we obtain from
(23) and (24) that signε(ave
i(pii(t))) = sign(avei(t)), i ∈
W(t). Consequently, we have avei(t)signε(ave
i(pii(t))) =
|avei(t)|, i ∈ W(t).
It then follows from (21) that
V˙ (x(t)) = −
∑
i∈W(t)
|avei(t)|, t ≥ 0.
Since |avei(t)| ≥ ε−2di(t−pii(t)) ≥ ε−2diT i, i ∈ W(t),
we have
V˙ (x(t)) ≤ −
∑
i∈W(t)
(ε− 2diT i) ≤ −α
∑
i∈W(t)
1
= −α
∑
i∈V
gi(t), t ≥ 0, (25)
where α , mini∈V(ε− 2diT i) and gi(t) , 1
[
t ∈ T i
]
. By
integrating both sides of (25),
V (x(t)) ≤ V (x(0)) − α
∫ t
0
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds, t ≥ 0. (26)
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Since V (x(t)) ≥ 0, it follows from (26) that∫ t
0
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds ≤
V (x(0))
α
, t ≥ 0. (27)
Now, let Hi , {ω ∈ Ω:
∑∞
k=0 ϕ
i
k = ∞} and H ,
∩i∈VHi. By (19), we have P[Hi] = 1, i ∈ V , and thus,
P[H ] = 1. In what follows, we show that finite time approx-
imate consensus is achieved for every ω ∈ H . Define
ki(t) , inf{k ∈ N0 : t
i
k > t, ϕ
i
k = 1},
and ti(t) , tki(t), i ∈ V . Here, t
i(t) denotes the first suc-
cessful communication time instant of agent i after time t.
Notice that for every ω ∈ H , we have ti(t) <∞, t ≥ 0.
Let T , mini∈V T
i and T , maxi∈V T
i. Moreover, let
ϑ0 , T , and
ϑk+1 , max
i∈V
ti(ϑk) + 2T , k ∈ N0.
First, we show that for every ω ∈ H ,
∫ ϑk+1−T
ϑk−T
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds ≥
(
max
i∈V
1[|avei(ϑk)| ≥ ε]
)
T . (28)
Notice that
∫ ϑk+1−T
ϑk−T
∑
i∈V g
i(s)ds ≥ 0, since gi(s) ≥ 0 for
i ∈ V . Therefore, in the case where maxi∈V 1[|avei(ϑk)| ≥
ε] = 0, we have (28). Now, consider the case where
maxi∈V 1[|avei(ϑk)| ≥ ε] = 1. In this case, there exists
an agent i∗ ∈ V such that |avei
∗
(ϑk)| ≥ ε. This agent
makes a successful communication with its neighbors at
time ti
∗
(ϑk) ∈ (ϑk, ϑk+1). If |avei
∗
(ti
∗
(ϑk))| ≥ ε, then
since T i < ∆i, by Lemma 3.2, we have |ui
∗
(t)| = 1,
t ∈ [ti
∗
(ϑk), t
i∗(ϑk) + T
i∗). Since |ui
∗
(t)| = 1 implies
gi
∗
(t) = 1, we have gi
∗
(t) = 1, t ∈ [ti
∗
(ϑk), t
i∗(ϑk)+T
i∗).
As a result,
∫ ϑk+1−T
ϑk−T
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds ≥
∫ ti∗ (ϑk)+T i
ti
∗ (ϑk)
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds
≥
∫ ti∗ (ϑk)+T i
ti
∗ (ϑk)
gi
∗
(s)ds = T i
∗
≥ T . (29)
On the other hand, if |avei
∗
(ti
∗
(ϑk))| < ε, then there may
be two cases: 1) agent i∗ was in the process of changing
its state at time ϑk and 2) the state of another agent j
∗ ∈
Ni∗ became closer to the state of agent i∗ in the interval
between the times ϑk and t
i∗(ϑk), since |ave
i∗(ϑk)| ≥ ε.
Case 1 implies that for some kˆ ∈ N0, we have ϕi
∗
kˆ
= 1
and |avei
∗
(ti
∗
kˆ
)| ≥ ε with ti
∗
kˆ
∈ [ϑk − T , ϑk]. Thus, by
Lemma 3.2, we get |ui
∗
(t)| = 1 for t ∈ [ti
∗
kˆ
, ti
∗
kˆ
+ T i
∗
)
implying gi
∗
(t) = 1, t ∈ [ti
∗
kˆ
, ti
∗
kˆ
+ T i
∗
). Consequently,
∫ ϑk+1−T
ϑk−T
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds ≥
∫ ti∗
kˆ
+T i
∗
ti
∗
kˆ
gi
∗
(s)ds = T i
∗
≥ T .
(30)
Case 2 implies that agent j∗ updated its state at least once in
the interval [ϑk−T , t
i∗(ϑk)+T
j∗). In other words, for some
k˜ ∈ N0, we have ϕ
j∗
k˜
= 1 and |avej
∗
(tj
∗
k˜
)| ≥ ε with tj
∗
k˜
∈
[ϑk −T , t
i∗(ϑk) +T
j∗). It then follows by Lemma 3.2 that
|uj
∗
(t)| = 1 for t ∈ [tj
∗
k˜
, tj
∗
k˜
+ T j
∗
). Therefore, gj
∗
(t) = 1
for t ∈ [tj
∗
k˜
, tj
∗
k˜
+ T j
∗
), and hence,
∫ ϑk+1−T
ϑk−T
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds ≥
∫ tj∗
k˜
+T j
∗
t
j∗
k˜
gj
∗
(s)ds = T j
∗
≥ T .
(31)
The inequalities (29)–(31) that are obtained for different
cases imply (28).
It follows from (27) and (28) that for every ω ∈ H ,
∞∑
k=0
max
i∈V
1[|avei(ϑk)| ≥ ε] ≤
1
T
∞∑
k=0
∫ ϑk+1−T
ϑk−T
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds
=
∫ ∞
0
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds ≤
1
T
V (x(0))
α
,
which implies that there exists k∗ ∈ N0 such that for ev-
ery k ∈ {k∗, k∗ + 1, . . .}, maxi∈V 1[|ave
i(ϑk)| ≥ ε] = 0.
Thus, for each agent i ∈ V , we have |avei(ϑk)| < ε and
|avei(ϑk+1)| < ε for k ∈ {k∗, k∗ + 1, . . .}. Therefore,
maxt∈[ϑk,ϑk+1)maxi∈V 1[|ave
i(t)| ≥ ε] = 1 implies that
at least one agent i∗ ∈ V started changing its state at some
time t˜i
∗
k ∈ (ϑk, ϑk+1), and thus by Lemma 3.2, we have
|ui
∗
(t)| = 1 for t ∈ [t˜i
∗
k , t˜
i∗
k + T
i∗) implying gi
∗
(t) = 1,
t ∈ [t˜i
∗
k , t˜
i∗
k + T
i∗). Consequently, by using an argument
similar to the one that we used for obtaining (28), we obtain
max
t∈[ϑk,ϑk+1)
max
i∈V
1[|avei(t)| ≥ ε]
≤
1
T
∫ ϑk+1+T
ϑk
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds ≤
1
T
∫ ϑk+2−T
ϑk−T
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds
=
1
T
∫ ϑk+1−T
ϑk−T
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds+
1
T
∫ ϑk+2−T
ϑk+1−T
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds,
for every k ∈ {k∗, k∗+1, . . .}. Now, by using this inequality
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together with (27),
∞∑
k=k∗
max
t∈[ϑk,ϑk+1)
max
i∈V
1[|avei(t)| ≥ ε]
≤
1
T
∞∑
k=k∗
∫ ϑk+1−T
ϑk−T
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds
+
1
T
∞∑
k=k∗+1
∫ ϑk+1−T
ϑk−T
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds
≤
2
T
∫ ∞
0
∑
i∈V
gi(s)ds ≤
2
T
V (x(0))
α
,
which implies that for every ω ∈ H , there exists k˜∗ ∈
{k∗, k∗ + 1, . . .} such that
max
t∈[ϑk,ϑk+1)
max
i∈V
1[|avei(t)| ≥ ε] = 0, k ∈ {k˜∗, k˜∗ + 1, . . .}.
Thus, for every ω ∈ H , we have |avei(t)| < ε for i ∈ V
and t ≥ ϑk˜∗ , implying almost sure finite time approximate
consensus, since P[H ] = 1.
Condition (19) in Theorem 3.3 is concerned with the long
run statistics of inter-agent communication attempts. Specif-
ically,
∑∞
k=0 ϕ
i
k in (19) represents the total number of suc-
cessful communication attempts of agent i. Under the con-
dition (19), this number exceeds all nonnegative integers
almost surely, indicating that each agent i can achieve in-
finitely many successful communications with its neighbors
in the long run. In Section 4, we will show that (19) holds
and consensus can be achieved under different attack strate-
gies that satisfy Assumption 2.1 on the average duration of
jamming.
For the proof of Theorem 3.3, we utilize the function
(1/2)xT(t)Lx(t) and explore its evolution. This approach
is also utilized by De Persis and Frasca (2013), Senejohnny
et al. (2015), and Senejohnny et al. (2017). However, there
are some key differences. An important role is played by
Lemma 3.2. Notice also that the analysis is facilitated by
the choice of parameters T i ∈ (0,min{ ε2di ,∆
i}), i ∈ V .
In particular, T i < ∆i allows us to utilize Lemma 3.2 to
characterize the durations for which agent i has a nonzero
control input. Furthermore, T i < ε2di ensures a certain de-
cay for the Lyapunov-like function (1/2)xT(t)Lx(t) after
a successful communication by agent i.
In our ternary control approach, after each successful
transmission at tik, agent i may only apply a constant
and bounded control input for a maximum duration of
T i. Thus the worst-case change in relative state positions
(
∑
j∈Ni
(xj(t) − xi(t))) during a control input application
by agent i can be calculated, since all agents can only
change their states with speed 1. This worst case is taken
into account in the design of T i for agent i. If instead of
the ternary input, real-valued avei(tik) is used, then agent i
would not be able to know how its neighbors may move.
This is because the control input of a neighboring agent
j ∈ N i depends on other agents’ states that agent i does
not have access to. As a result, agent i may not be able to
choose an appropriate control input application duration to
guarantee a decrease in the Lyapunov-like function.
We note that the notion of finite-time approximate consensus
that we utilize in Theorem 3.3 is similar to the notion of
finite-time contractive stability discussed in Dorato (2006)
for nonlinear dynamical systems. In particular, agent states
that are initially outside the approximate consensus set Dε
enter Dε in finite time and stay there, with probability one.
This approximate consensus time is a random variable that
depends on the initial agent states, the network topology, the
communication attempt times, as well as the jamming times
and durations.
Our control approach and hence the consensus time achieved
with it have different characteristics from the ones in De
Persis and Frasca (2013), Senejohnny et al. (2015), and
Senejohnny et al. (2017). In those works, the control input
values are changed at communication attempt time instants
and at each communication attempt time tik, agent i decides
the next communication time based on the average distance
|avei(tk)| from its neighbors. If this distance is large, then
the duration until the next communication time becomes
large. On the other hand, in our approach, when agent i
makes a successful communication at time tik and sets a
nonzero control input, this input is not necessarily kept con-
stant until the next communication time tik+1. As we discuss
above, the time tik+1 may be far from t
i
k. In such cases, the
control input is set to zero at time tik + T
i and zero input
is used until time tik+1. With this approach, we are allowed
to pick large ∆i values in our randomized communication
approach to increase the expected interval length between
consecutive communication attempts and reduce the num-
ber of transmissions. Consensus is guaranteed as long as
T i ∈ (0,min{ ε2di ,∆
i}), i ∈ V . In the absence of jamming
attacks, the approximate consensus time achieved with our
control approach can be larger than the time achieved with
the approach of De Persis and Frasca (2013), since in our
approach, control inputs of agents may be set to zero be-
tween consecutive communication times. We note that to re-
duce the expected total duration for which the control input
is zero, T i can be selected close to ∆i, which also reduces
the time when consensus is achieved.
4 Deterministic Jamming and Communication-Aware
Jamming
In this section, we consider two different attack strategies
that a jamming attacker may follow.We show that consensus
can be achieved in both cases.
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4.1 Consensus Under Deterministic Attacks
First, we consider the attack strategy where the starting time
and the duration of the jamming attacks do not depend on the
time instants at which the agents try to communicate. In par-
ticular, concerning the sequences {ak}k∈N0 and {τk}k∈N0 ,
we assume the following.
Assumption 4.1. The sequences {ak}k∈N0 and {τk}k∈N0 ,
which characterize the jamming attacks, are decided deter-
ministically, that is, for every ω ∈ Ω and k ∈ N0,
ak(ω) = a¯k, τk(ω) = τ¯k, (32)
where a¯k ≥ 0 and τ¯k ≥ 0 for k ∈ N0 are fixed scalars.
Assumption 4.1 is useful to model scenarios where the at-
tacker cannot detect the transmissions on the communication
channels. Note that the attacker may still be knowledgeable
on certain properties of the multi-agent system such as the
number of agents, communication topology, as well as the
scalars ∆i, i ∈ V , used in the communication protocol.
Our analysis relies on a few key definitions. First, let
γi , min
{
k ∈ N : k∆i > κ/(1− ρ)
}
, i ∈ V . (33)
Now define ∆ˆi > 0 and ϕˆik ∈ {0, 1}, k ∈ N0, by
∆ˆi , γi∆i, (34)
ϕˆik ,
{
0, if ϕi
kγi
= 0, · · · , ϕi(k+1)γi−1 = 0,
1, otherwise.
(35)
With these definitions, ∆ˆi is an integer multiple of∆i that is
selected to be larger than κ/(1−ρ). In the interval [k∆ˆi, (k+
1)∆ˆi), agent imakes γi number of communication attempts
with its neighbors, and moreover, ϕˆik takes the value 0 if all
of these attempts fail and 1 if one or more of these attempts
are successful. We emphasize that γi, ∆ˆi, and ϕˆik are used
only for the purpose of analysis, and their values are not
needed in our stochastic communication protocol.
We now show that under Assumptions 2.1 and 4.1, agents
can successfully communicate with their neighbors infinitely
many times in the long run, almost surely.
Proposition 4.2. For any jamming attacks described by se-
quences {ak}k∈N0 and {τk}k∈N0 that satisfy Assumptions
2.1 and 4.1, the equality in (19) holds.
Proof. It follows from (35) that for every i ∈ V ,
P
[ ∞∑
k=0
ϕik ≥M
]
≥ P
[ ∞∑
k=0
ϕˆik ≥M
]
, M ∈ N0. (36)
In what follows, we show (19) by proving that
P
[ ∞∑
k=0
ϕˆik ≥M
]
= 1, M ∈ N0, i ∈ V . (37)
First, let Bik , {ω ∈ Ω : ϕˆ
i
k(ω) = 1}, k ∈ N0, and
E ,
⋂∞
l=0
(⋃
k≥l B
i
k
)
. Furthermore, for each k ∈ N0, let
βik : Ω→ {0, 1, . . . , γ
i−1} be a random variable distributed
according to P[βik = l] = 1/γ
i for each l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , γi −
1}, and define tˆik , t
i
kγi+βi
k
, k ∈ N0.
Note that tˆik is a random variable distributed uniformly
in [k∆ˆi, (k + 1)∆ˆi). Since Bik =
⋃γi−1
l=0 {t
i
kγi+l ∈
A
c
(k∆ˆi, (k + 1)∆ˆi)}, we have Bik ⊇ {tˆ
i
k ∈ A
c
(k∆ˆi, (k +
1)∆ˆi)}. Hence,
P[Bik] ≥ P[tˆ
i
k ∈ A
c
(k∆ˆi, (k + 1)∆ˆi)]
= P[tˆik /∈ A(k∆ˆ
i, (k + 1)∆ˆi)]
=
∆ˆi − |A(k∆ˆi, (k + 1)∆ˆi)|
∆ˆi
, k ∈ N0.
By Assumption 2.1 and ∆ˆi > κ/(1− ρ), we obtain
P[Bik] ≥
∆ˆi − κ− ρ∆ˆi
∆ˆi
= 1− ρ−
κ
∆ˆi
> 0, k ∈ N0.
As a consequence,
∑∞
k=0 P[B
i
k] =∞. Now, since t
i
0, t
i
1, . . .
are independent and the sequences {ak}k∈N0 and {τk}k∈N0
are deterministic (by Assumption 4.1), the eventsBi0, B
i
1, . . .
are independent. Therefore, it follows from
∑∞
k=0 P[B
i
k] =
∞ and the Borel-Cantelli Lemma (see Theorem 3.22 of
Karr (1993)) that P[E] = 1. Consequently, noting that {ω ∈
Ω:
∑∞
k=0 ϕˆ
i
k(ω) ≥ M} ⊇ E, we obtain P[
∑∞
k=0 ϕˆ
i
k ≥
M ] ≥ P[E]. Hence, (37) holds. Finally, (19) follows from
(36) and (37).
Proposition 4.2 implies that agents can achieve infinitely
many successful communications with their neighbors in the
long run under any deterministic attack strategy satisfying
(5) in Assumption 2.1.
The proof of Proposition 4.2 relies on a few essential princi-
ples. First of all, we do not directly compute the successful
communications in each∆i-length interval. Instead, we look
at the longer ∆ˆi-length intervals and compute how many of
these intervals include successful communications. This is
useful due to the fact that ∆ˆi is chosen for the analysis to
be larger than the longest possible duration κ/(1 − ρ) of a
continuous jamming attack. Regardless of how large κ ≥ 0
and ρ ∈ (0, 1) can be, there always exists such a ∆ˆi as given
in (34). We remark again that since ∆ˆi is needed only for
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the analysis, its value is not necessary for the multi-agent
operation.
In the proof of Proposition 4.2, we also take advantage of the
uniform distribution of the communication attempt times in
each ∆i-length interval. The probability of at least one suc-
cessful communication in a ∆ˆi-length interval [k∆ˆi, (k +
1)∆ˆi) is lower-bounded by the probability of an event that
we construct in the proof. This is the event that one of
communication attempt times that is selected uniformly ran-
domly from the γi number of attempt times in the inter-
val [k∆ˆi, (k + 1)∆ˆi) does not face a jamming attack. The
uniform distribution property of the attempt times over the
∆i-length intervals and thus the ∆ˆi-length intervals allows
derivation of the probability bound.
The proof of Proposition 4.2 also relies on the fact that the
attacks are deterministic, and hence the attack times do not
depend on the communication attempt times.
Next, by using Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 3.3, we show
that under deterministic attacks, the multi-agent system (1),
(10) achieves consensus in finite time, almost surely.
Theorem 4.3. Consider the multi-agent system (1), (10)
with T i ∈ (0,min{ ε2di ,∆
i}) where ε > 0. For any jamming
attacks described by sequences {ak}k∈N0 and {τk}k∈N0 that
satisfy Assumptions 2.1 and 4.1, x(t) converges in finite time
to a vector x∗ ∈ Rn belonging to the set Dε given by (2),
almost surely.
Proof. By Proposition 4.2, we have (19). Thus, the result
follows from Theorem 3.3.
We emphasize again that the result does not depend on the
frequency of attacks. In particular, the proposed stochastic
communication protocol allows us to deal with attack scenar-
ios where the jamming is turned on and off very frequently.
4.2 Consensus Under Communication-Aware Attacks
We now explore an attack strategy where the attacker can
sense communication attempts on the channel and turns the
jamming on and off based on the activity of the agents.
Here, we consider a simpler setup where ∆i = ∆, i ∈ V ,
with ∆ > 0. In this setup, kth communication attempt time
of each agent is in the interval [k∆, (k + 1)∆), i.e., tik ∈
[k∆, (k + 1)∆), i ∈ V . Let t¯k , maxi∈V{tik}.
We consider an attack strategy where the attacker knows
about the communication protocol as well as∆. The attacker
generates an attack so that for each interval [k∆, (k+1)∆),
i) the jamming attack starts from t = k∆,
ii) the jamming attack continues until time t¯k as long as
Assumption 2.1 is satisfied.
Figure 3. Attack times for the communication-aware attack strat-
egy.
Under this strategy, for the interval [k∆, (k + 1)∆), the
attacker turns off jamming right after all communication
attempts are blocked. This allows the attacker to preserve
energy to be used later. Furthermore, the attacker can block
transmissions among the agents in a more thorough way
than the deterministic strategy. Clearly, if the attacker wants
to interfere at the randomly chosen communication attempt
times for sure, he has to keep jamming until t¯k in each
interval [k∆, (k + 1)∆).
To characterize ak, τk, k ∈ N0, for this strategy, first let
sk , max
{
s ∈ [0,∆] :
|A(τ, k∆)|+ s ≤ κ+ ρ(k∆+ s− τ), τ ∈ [0, k∆]
}
,
for k ∈ N0. Note that sk ∈ [0,∆] denotes the largest dura-
tion that a jamming attack starting at k∆ can last without
violating the condition (5) in Assumption 2.1. Now, let
sk , min{t¯k − k∆, sk}, k ∈ N0.
Observe that sk gives the duration of the attack in the interval
[k∆, (k + 1)∆) for this strategy. In particular, the jamming
attack is turned on for t ∈ [k∆, k∆+ sk], and turned off for
t ∈ (k∆+ sk, (k + 1)∆). Hence, ak, τk can be given by
ak = k∆, τk = sk, k ∈ N0. (38)
Consequently, the set of time instants where communication
is not possible in the interval [k∆, (k + 1)∆) is then given
by the set Ak , [ak, ak + τk] = [k∆, k∆+ sk]. We remark
that the communication-aware jamming described by (38)
satisfies (5) in Assumption 2.1 by construction.
To illustrate the properties of the communication-aware at-
tack strategy, we show an example attack scenario in Fig-
ure 3. Here, the attacker is able to block all communications
that are attempted in the interval [0,∆) by jamming the net-
work between times 0 and t¯0 = maxi∈V t
i
0. After blocking,
the attacker turns off jamming and waits until the next in-
terval [∆, 2∆). In the interval [∆, 2∆), the duration of the
attack is relatively large, because agent 2 attempts commu-
nication towards the end of the interval. The attacker has to
use large energy resources for this interval. As a result, the
attacker cannot conduct an attack with very long duration
in the interval [2∆, 3∆), since Assumption 2.1 holds only
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for a short duration of length τ2. And after that, the attacker
has to turn off jamming to save resources. Therefore, in the
interval [2∆, 3∆), it happens that agent 1 can successfully
communicate after the jamming is turned off. As a result,
we have ϕ10 = 0, ϕ
1
1 = 0, ϕ
1
2 = 1.
We show in the following that the agents achieve consensus
under the communication-aware attack strategy given in (38)
by using our proposed stochastic communication protocol.
Now, consider γi ∈ N, ∆ˆi > 0, and ϕˆik ∈ {0, 1}, k ∈ N0,
i ∈ V , given by (33)–(35) with ∆i = ∆. Note that in this
subsection, we have γi = γj , ∆ˆi = ∆ˆj for all i, j ∈ V ,
since ∆i = ∆j , i, j ∈ V . We can thus simplify the notation
by setting
γ , γ1, ∆ˆ , ∆ˆ1. (39)
The analysis of consensus under communication-aware
jamming attacks is quite different from the case with deter-
ministic jamming attacks. Here, we utilize a filtration repre-
senting the timing of the attacks and communication attempt
instants. In particular, we consider the filtration {Hik}k∈N0 ,
where Hik denotes the σ-algebra generated by the random
variables a0, a1, . . . a(k+1)γ−1, τ0, τ1, . . . , τ(k+1)γ−1, and
ti0, t
i
1, . . . , t
i
(k+1)γ−1. Notice that ϕ
i
j , j ∈ {0, . . . , (k +
1)γ − 1}, are Hik-measurable random variables, because
ϕij is determined by aj , τj , and t
i
j . Consequently, ϕˆ
i
j ,
j ∈ {0, . . . , k}, are also Hik-measurable. In the statement
of the results below, in addition to {Hik}k∈N0 , we also use
the σ-algebra Hi−1, which we define as H
i
−1 , {∅,Ω}.
In what follows our main objective is to show that the agents
can communicate with their neighbors infinitely many times
in the long run satisfying (19), even though the network
faces communication-aware jamming attacks described in
(38). We show this by establishing several key results. First,
we investigate the probability of successful communications
in the intervals [k∆ˆ, (k + 1)∆ˆ), k ∈ N0. The following
result provides a positive lower-bound for the conditional
probability of a successful communication in [k∆ˆ, (k+1)∆ˆ)
given Hik−1 (i.e., the information on all previous intervals).
Lemma 4.4. Consider the stochastic communication proto-
col in Definition 3.1. For the attacks given by (38), we have
P[ϕˆik = 1 | H
i
k−1] ≥ 2q
γ , k ∈ N0, i ∈ V , (40)
where
q ,
∆˜
∆
, ∆˜ ,
(1− ρ)(∆ˆ−∆)
γ + 1
, ∆ ,
κ
1− ρ
. (41)
The proof of Lemma 4.4 is given in Appendix A.
In (40), the conditional probability term P[ϕˆik = 1 | H
i
k−1]
is an Hik−1-measurable random variable. Furthermore, its
expectation gives the probability of having ϕˆik = 1, i.e.,
P[ϕˆik = 1] = E[P[ϕˆ
i
k = 1 | H
i
k−1]]. Hence, Lemma 4.4 im-
plies P[ϕˆik] > 0, k ∈ N0. In other words, for each inter-
val [k∆ˆ, (k+1)∆ˆ), our stochastic communication protocol
guarantees a positive probability for a successful communi-
cation.
In the proof of Lemma 4.4, we consider the interval
[k∆ˆi, (k+1)∆ˆ) that is composed of γ number of ∆-length
intervals. In each of these ∆-length intervals, agent i at-
tempts to communicate once. In our approach, we find a
lower bound for P[ϕˆik = 1 | H
i
k−1] (the conditional prob-
ability that at least 1 out of γ communication attempts is
successful). This is done by computing a lower bound for
P[ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1|H
i
k−1], which is the conditional proba-
bility that the last attempt is successful. The key method in
deriving this bound is the construction of the eventGk given
in (A.7). Here, Gk is the event that the first γ−1 number of
communication attempts of agent i happen in the last ∆˜ units
of time in their respective ∆-length intervals. If Gk hap-
pens, then it means that the attacker needs to use sufficiently
large jamming resources to block those first γ− 1 attempts.
As a result, the attacker would not have enough resources
left to guarantee blocking the last attempt. This allows us to
compute a lower bound of P[{ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1}∩Gk|H
i
k−1].
We then use the inequality P[ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1|H
i
k−1] ≥
P[{ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1}∩Gk|H
i
k−1] to arrive at the result (40).
This result is crucial in proving the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5. Consider the attack strategy described by
(38). Under the stochastic communication protocol in Defi-
nition 3.1, we have
P[
N−1⋂
k=0
{ϕˆik = ϕk+1}] ≤
N∏
j=1
(
1− 2qγ(1− ϕj)
)
, (42)
for ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕN ∈ {0, 1} and N ∈ N.
The proof of Lemma 4.5 is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 4.5 provides an upper bound for the probability of
the event that the random variables ϕˆi0, ϕˆ
i
1, . . . , ϕˆ
i
N−1 take
the particular values ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕN ∈ {0, 1}, respectively.
This result is important because the upper-bound can be
given in terms of the scalar q, which depends on ρ and
κ characterizing the attacker’s capabilities as well as the
parameter ∆ of the communication protocol. Notice that if
the sequence ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕN is formed of m number of 1s
andN−m number of 0s, then the probability bound in (42)
is given by (1−2qγ)N−m. The following result is built upon
this observation.
Proposition 4.6. Consider the attack strategy described by
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(38). Under the stochastic communication protocol in Defi-
nition 3.1, we have
P[
N−1∑
k=0
ϕˆik ≥M ] ≥ 1−
M−1∑
m=0
N !
m!(N −m)!
(1− 2qγ)N−m,
(43)
for all M ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} and N ∈ N.
Proof. First, we obtain
P[
N−1∑
k=0
ϕˆik ≥M ] = 1− P[
M−1⋃
m=0
{
N−1∑
k=0
ϕˆik = m}]
≥ 1−
M−1∑
m=0
P[
N−1∑
k=0
ϕˆik = m]. (44)
Now, let ΠiN,m , {ϕ ∈ {0, 1}
N : ϕTϕ = m} for m ∈
{0, 1, . . . ,M} and N ∈ {M,M + 1, . . .}. Notice that
P[
N−1∑
k=0
ϕˆik = m] = P[∪ϕ∈Πi
N,m
∩N−1k=0 {ϕˆ
i
k = ϕk+1}]
≤
∑
ϕ∈Πi
N,m
P[∩N−1k=0 {ϕˆ
i
k = ϕk+1}]. (45)
By using Lemma 4.5 we obtain from (45) that
P[
N−1∑
k=0
ϕˆik = m] ≤
∑
ϕ∈Πi
N,m
N∏
j=1
(
1− 2qγ(1− ϕj)
)
. (46)
Note that
∏N
j=1
(
1−2qγ(1−ϕj)
)
= (1−2qγ)N−m for ϕ ∈
ΠiN,m. Furthermore, the set Π
i
N,m has
N !
m!(N−m)! elements.
Therefore, it follows from (46) that
P[
N−1∑
k=0
ϕˆik = m] ≤
∑
ϕ∈Πi
N,m
(1− 2qγ)N−m
=
N !
m!(N −m)!
(1− 2qγ)N−m. (47)
Finally, by using (44) and (47), we arrive at (43).
Proposition 4.6 provides a lower bound of the probability
that agent i can communicate with its neighbors at least
M times during the interval [0, N∆ˆ). Notice that as N ap-
proaches∞, this lower bound approaches 1.
Theorem 4.7. Consider the attack strategy described by
(38). Under the stochastic communication protocol in Defi-
nition 3.1, the equality in (19) holds.
Proof. Our initial goal is to show
P[
∞∑
k=0
ϕˆik ≥M ] = 1, M ∈ N0, i ∈ V . (48)
To this end, first let AN , {ω ∈ Ω:
∑N−1
k=0 ϕˆ
i
k ≥ M},
N ∈ N. Notice that P[AN ] = 0 for N < M . For N ≥ M ,
Proposition 4.6 implies
P[AN ] ≥ 1−
M−1∑
m=0
N !
m!(N −m)!
(1− 2qγ)N−m. (49)
Since 1−2qγ < 1, it follows from (49) that limN→∞ P[AN ] =
1. The events AN , N ∈ N, satisfy AN ⊆ AN+1. Hence,
by the monotone-convergence theorem for sets (see Sec-
tion 1.10 in Williams (1991)),
P[
∞∑
k=0
ϕˆik ≥M ] = P[ lim
N→∞
AN ] = lim
N→∞
P[AN ] = 1. (50)
Finally, since P[
∑∞
k=0 ϕ
i
k ≥ M ] ≥ P[
∑∞
k=0 ϕˆ
i
k ≥ M ], it
follows from (50) that (19) holds.
Theorem 4.7 shows that the agents can communicate with
their neighbors infinitely many times in the long run, even
though the network is attacked by an attacker that follows the
communication-aware attack strategy described in (38). The
next theorem is the main result for the multi-agent system
under communication-aware attacks.
Theorem 4.8. Consider the multi-agent system (1), (10)
with T i ∈ (0,min{ ε2di ,∆
i}) where ε > 0. For the attack
strategy described by (38), x(t) converges in finite time to a
vector x∗ ∈ Rn belonging to the set Dε given by (2), almost
surely.
Proof. By Theorem 4.7, we have (19). Consequently, the
result follows from Theorem 3.3.
So far we considered the consensus problem under both
deterministic attacks and communication-aware attacks. In
both cases, the randomness in the communication attempt
times is the key property that enables consensus regardless
of the frequency of jamming. A difference is that the at-
tacker following the communication-aware attack strategy
can sense the network activity and switch off the jamming
attack right after blocking a communication attempt. This
allows the attacker to preserve energy. This is further illus-
trated through numerical examples in the next section.
5 Numerical Examples
In this section, we illustrate our results for the multi-agent
system with n = 6 agents whose topology is shown in
Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Communication topology of the multi-agent system.
Figure 5. Evolution of agent states under deterministic attacks with
low frequency (top) and high frequency (bottom) settings.
5.1 Deterministic Attacks
We first consider a deterministic attack scenario where the
strategy of the attacker satisfies Assumptions 2.1 and 4.1
with κ = 0.2, ρ = 0.8. We utilize our proposed stochastic
communication protocol with ∆i = 0.001+ 0.0001(i+ 1),
i ∈ V . For the control laws (10), we choose T i = ∆i/1.01,
which satisfy T i ∈ (0,min{ ε2di ,∆
i}) with ε = 0.02. Since
Proposition 4.2 implies (19), it follows from Theorem 4.3
that the multi-agent system achieves consensus.
In the top part of Figure 5, we show sample paths of agent
states under jamming attackswith low frequency.We see that
consensus is achieved around the time t = 3.85. Each agent
i attempts to communicate once at a random time instant at
every∆i units of time. The agents keep their states constant
during long jamming intervals.
The attack depicted in the top part of Figure 5 is of low
frequency, as the jamming is turned on and off only 7 times
during the interval [0, 5]. We also consider a high frequency
case in the bottom plot of Figure 5, where jamming is turned
on and off 7935 times during the interval [0, 5], but the agent
communication attempt times are the same as those in the
top plot. Also in this case, the agents reach the consensus
set Dε around the time t = 3.91. Both the low and the high
frequency attacks in Figure 5 are generated randomly and
independently of the communication attempt times of the
agents. Through repeated simulations, we also observe that
consensus is reached around the same time.
Next, we consider periodically generated jamming attacks
Table 1
Mean mC and standard deviation sC of consensus times for dif-
ferent values of ρ and σ in deterministic attacks (51).
σ = 101 σ = 103 σ = 105
ρ mC sC mC sC mC sC
0.2 1.143 0.005 1.108 0.015 1.110 0.013
0.5 1.822 0.006 1.663 0.029 1.682 0.035
0.8 4.532 0.035 3.962 0.086 4.010 0.107
with
ak ,
k
σ
+
(1 − ρ)
σ
, τk ,
ρ
σ
, k ∈ N0, (51)
where σ > 0 denotes the frequency of attacks (i.e., the
number of attack intervals in 1 unit of time). Moreover,
ρ > 0 indicates the ratio of the duration of attacks in each
period. For each ρ ∈ {0.2, 0.5, 0.8} and σ ∈ {101, 103, 105}
we repeat the simulation 50 times. For each simulation j ∈
{1, . . . , 50}, we calculate tC(j) , inf{t : xi(t) ∈ Dε, i ∈
V}, which is the time agents reach consensus. Then we
obtain their mean mC > 0 and standard deviation sC > 0.
Table 1 indicates that increasing the ratio ρ of the attack
duration allows the attacker to delay the consensus. On the
other hand, consensus time is not influenced a lot by how
frequent the attacks are. For each value of ρ, mean consensus
time mC is similar under all attack frequency settings σ =
101, 103, 105. Furthermore, consensus times are finite in all
simulations and they do not show large deviation (i.e., sC
is small) in all cases. The cases with ρ = 0.8 indicate that
periodic attacks and the attack timings shown in Figure 5
do not differ much in their effects on consensus times.
5.2 Communication-Aware Attacks
Next, we consider the scenario where the attacker follows
the communication-aware attack strategy of (38) with the
same parameters κ = 0.2 and ρ = 0.8 as in Section 5.1.
In this scenario, the intervals for the communication are se-
lected as∆i = ∆ = 0.001, i ∈ V . Similar to the determinis-
tic case discussed above, for the control law (10), we choose
T i = ∆/1.01, i ∈ V , which satisfy T i ∈ (0,min{ ε2di ,∆
i})
with ε = 0.02. Furthermore, Theorem 4.7 implies that (19)
holds. Therefore, it follows from Theorem 4.8 that the multi-
agent system with the stochastic communication protocol
achieves consensus.
We show the evolution of the agent states in Figure 6. Notice
that every communication attempt in the interval [0, 3.18]
is blocked by the attacker. However, the attacker’s energy
resources eventually become not sufficient. We observe in
the enlarged plot in the bottom part of Figure 6 that some
of the communication attempts cannot be blocked by the
attacker and the agents eventually achieve consensus.
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Figure 6. Evolution of agent states under communication-aware
attacks.
Figure 7. Effect of the bound ρ of average attack duration ratio to
consensus time tC for different values of κ.
Even though the value of ρ is the same with ρ = 0.8 as in
the deterministic attacks case of the previous example, the
communication-aware attacks can be more malicious in the
sense that they can delay consensus (compare Figures 5 and
6). To further investigate how ρ and κ affect the consensus
time, we run simulations with different values of ρ and κ
but with the same communication attempt times used for
constructing Figure 6. We observe in Figure 7 that consensus
time tC increases as ρ increases. The scalar κ ≥ 0 also has
an effect on the consensus time. In particular, increasing
κ delays the consensus, since the duration for continuous
jamming becomes larger.
We remark that in communication-aware attacks, the attacker
turns jamming on and off once in every ∆-length intervals.
Hence, the frequency of attacks is equal to the frequency of
communication attempts. This case is outside the class of at-
tacks considered previously in Senejohnny et al. (2015). On
the other hand, the class of attacks under which our commu-
nication protocol allows consensus is not restricted by the
frequency of attacks. Specifically, as long as the average ra-
tio of the duration of attacks in the long run is bounded by
ρ < 1, consensus can be achieved.
Remark 5.1. Although the randomized transmission ap-
proach expands the class of attacks under which consen-
sus can be achieved, the number of communication attempts
made by agents can be large compared to that in the self-
triggered communication schemes of De Persis and Frasca
(2013), Senejohnny et al. (2015), and Senejohnny et al.
(2017). In the self-triggered communication schemes, each
agent i computes its next communication time tik+1 based on
neighboring agents’ states at time tik. If the states of neigh-
boring agents are far from agent i’s state, then tik+1 takes a
large value. This approach reduces the number of transmis-
sions and keeps the communication costs low. In the ran-
domized transmission scheme of this paper, the number of
communication attempts made by agent i in a fixed inter-
val [0, t] can be reduced by increasing ∆i in Definition 3.1.
However, setting a large value to ∆i results in slow conver-
gence towards the consensus set, since each agent i applies
control inputs only for at most T i units of time between each
communication attempt. The approximate consensus time
achieved with our control approach can be larger than the
time achieved with the approach of above-mentionedworks,
since in our approach, control inputs of agents may be set
to zero between consecutive communication times.
To reduce the expected total time where the control inputs
have zero value before reaching consensus, T i can be se-
lected close to ∆i. This also reduces the time to reach con-
sensus. We observe through simulations that with smaller T i
(given by T i = ∆i/2.1) consensus is achieved at time tC =
22.92. On the other hand, when T i is larger (T i = ∆i/1.01
as in the setting of this section) consensus is achieved for
the same attack parameters at an earlier time tC = 12.79 as
shown in Figure 6.
We note that a new hybrid self-triggered and randomized ap-
proach can be useful in reducing the communication loads
while protecting against a large class of attacks and achiev-
ing faster consensus. In the hybrid approach, the neighbor-
ing agents’ states obtained at time tik can be used by agent
i for choosing the length ∆ik+1 of the interval in which the
next transmission attempt time tik+1 is randomly selected.
6 Conclusion
We proposed a stochastic communication protocol for multi-
agent consensus under jamming attacks. In this protocol,
agents attempt to exchange information with their neighbors
at uniformly distributed random time instants. We showed
that our proposed communication protocol guarantees con-
sensus as long as the jamming attacks satisfy a certain con-
dition on the average ratio of their duration. We demon-
strated our results both for a deterministic attack strategy
and a communication-aware attack strategy.
The analysis in this paper enables a natural extension to the
case with multiple jamming attackers that can attack dif-
ferent links at different times. In such a problem setting,
if the deterministic or the communication-aware attack for
each communication link satisfies Assumption 2.1, then two
agents can communicate over that link infinitely many times
in the long run. This allows agents to achieve consensus
through a modified control law where each agent can com-
municate with different neighbors at different times.
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A Proof of Lemma 4.4
In the interval [k∆ˆi, (k+1)∆ˆ) = [kγ∆, (k+1)γ∆), agent i
attempts communication with its neighbors for γ number of
times at time instants tikγ , t
i
kγ+1, . . . , t
i
(k+1)γ−1. It follows
from the definition of ϕˆik in (35) and (39) that
P[ϕˆik = 1|H
i
k−1] ≥ P[ϕ
i
(k+1)γ−1 = 1|H
i
k−1], (A.1)
where the right-hand side represents the conditional prob-
ability of a successful communication at time ti(k+1)γ−1.
Hence, to prove (40) it suffices to show
P[ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1|H
i
k−1] ≥ 2q
γ , k ∈ N0. (A.2)
To show (A.2), we first consider the case γ = 1. In this case,
∆ˆ = ∆ and |A(k∆, (k + 1)∆)| = τk < ∆, almost surely.
Moreover, we have
P[ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1|H
i
k−1] = P[ϕ
i
k = 1|H
i
k−1]
= P[tik /∈ A(k∆, (k + 1)∆)|H
i
k−1]
≥ P[{tik ≥ k∆+∆} ∩ {τk < ∆}|H
i
k−1]. (A.3)
Now, since P[τk ≥ ∆] = 0, we have P[τk ≥ ∆|H
i
k−1] = 0,
almost surely. As a result, P[{tik ≥ k∆ + ∆} ∩ {τk ≥
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∆}|Hik−1] ≤ P[τk ≥ ∆|H
i
k−1] = 0. Hence,
P[tik ≥ k∆+∆|H
i
k−1]
= P[{tik ≥ k∆+∆} ∩ {τk < ∆}|H
i
k−1]
+ P[{tik ≥ k∆+∆} ∩ {τk ≥ ∆}|H
i
k−1]
= P[{tik ≥ k∆+∆} ∩ {τk < ∆}|H
i
k−1]. (A.4)
By using (A.3) and (A.4), we obtain
P[ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1|H
i
k−1] ≥ P[t
i
k ≥ k∆+∆|H
i
k−1]. (A.5)
Since, tik is independent of H
i
k−1, we have P[t
i
k ≥ k∆ +
∆|Hik−1] = P[t
i
k ≥ k∆+∆]. It then follows from (A.5) that
P[ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1|H
i
k−1] ≥ P[t
i
k ≥ k∆+∆] =
∆−∆
∆
=
∆ˆ−∆
∆
≥
(1− ρ)(∆ˆ−∆)
∆
=
2∆˜
∆
= 2q, (A.6)
which shows that (A.2) holds when γ = 1.
Now, consider the case γ ≥ 2. By noting ∆˜ < ∆, we let
Fk ,
{
ω ∈ Ω : tik ∈
[
(k + 1)∆− ∆˜, (k + 1)∆
)}
, k ∈ N.
Observe that Fk ∈ F denotes the event that the random
communication attempt time tik falls on the last ∆˜ units of
time in the interval [k∆, (k + 1)∆). Consider the interval
[k∆ˆ, (k+1)∆ˆ). Notice that the communication attempts in
this interval occur at time instants tikγ , t
i
kγ+1, . . . , t
i
(k+1)γ−1.
Let the events Gk ∈ F , k ∈ N0, be given by
Gk , Fkγ ∩ Fkγ+1 ∩ · · · ∩ F(k+1)γ−2, k ∈ N0. (A.7)
It follows that
P[ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1|H
i
k−1]
= P[{ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1} ∩Gk|H
i
k−1]
+ P[{ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1} ∩G
c
k|H
i
k−1]
≥ P[{ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1} ∩Gk|H
i
k−1]. (A.8)
In the remainder of the proof, we will show
P[{ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1} ∩Gk|H
i
k−1] ≥ 2qP[Gk|H
i
k−1] (A.9)
and
P[Gk|H
i
k−1] = P[Gk] = q
γ−1. (A.10)
We will then use (A.8)–(A.10) to show (A.2).
To establish (A.9), we first simplify the presentation and
define the time instants bk , kγ∆, ck , (k + 1)γ∆ −∆,
and dk , (k+1)γ∆, for k ∈ N0. Observe that [bk, ck) gives
the union of the first γ − 1 number of ∆-length intervals
in [k∆ˆ, (k +1)∆ˆ), and moreover, [ck, dk) gives the last ∆-
length interval. Hence,
P[{ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1} ∩Gk|H
i
k−1]
= P[{ti(k+1)γ−1 /∈ A(ck, dk)} ∩Gk|H
i
k−1]
≥ P[{ti(k+1)γ−1 > dk − 2∆˜}
∩ {|A(ck, dk)| ≤ ∆− 2∆˜} ∩Gk|H
i
k−1]]. (A.11)
By noting that [kγ∆, (k + 1)γ∆) = [bk, dk) = [bk, ck) ∪
[ck, dk), we obtain |A(ck, dk)| = |A(bk, dk)| − |A(bk, ck)|.
It then follows from Assumption 2.1 that
|A(ck, dk)| ≤ κ+ ρ∆ˆ− |A(bk, ck)|. (A.12)
Noting that 2∆˜ < ∆, we use (A.12) to show that the events
{|A(ck, dk)| ≤ ∆ − 2∆˜} ∈ F and {|A(bk, ck)| ≥ (γ −
1)(∆− ∆˜)} ∈ F satisfy
{|A(ck, dk)| ≤ ∆− 2∆˜}
⊇ {κ+ ρ∆ˆ− |A(bk, ck)| ≤ ∆− 2∆˜}
= {|A(bk, ck)| ≥ κ+ ρ∆ˆ−∆+ 2∆˜}
= {|A(bk, ck)| ≥ (γ − 1)(∆− ∆˜)}. (A.13)
As a consequence of (A.11) and (A.13), we obtain
P[{ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1} ∩Gk|H
i
k−1]
≥ P[{ti(k+1)γ−1 > dk − 2∆˜}
∩ {|A(bk, ck)| ≥ (γ − 1)(∆− ∆˜)} ∩Gk|H
i
k−1].
Thus, since ti(k+1)γ−1 is independent of A(bk, ck), Gk, and
Hik−1, we obtain
P[{ϕi(k+1)γ−1 = 1} ∩Gk|H
i
k−1]
≥ P[ti(k+1)γ−1 > dk − 2∆˜]
· P[{|A(bk, ck)| ≥ (γ − 1)(∆− ∆˜)} ∩Gk|H
i
k−1]
= 2qP[{|A(bk, ck)| ≥ (γ − 1)(∆− ∆˜)} ∩Gk|H
i
k−1].
(A.14)
Here, we have Gk ⊆ {ω ∈ Ω: |A(bk, ck)| ≥ (γ − 1)(∆ −
∆˜)} and hence {|A(bk, ck)| ≥ (γ−1)(∆−∆˜)}∩Gk = Gk.
This is because, for every outcome ω∗ ∈ Gk, the first γ− 1
communication attempts of agent i happen in the last ∆˜
units of time in their respective intervals, and thus by (38),
the total duration of the attacks in the interval
[
bk, ck
)
is at
least (γ − 1)(∆ − ∆˜) units of time, implying ω∗ ∈ {ω ∈
Ω: |A(bk, ck)| ≥ (γ − 1)(∆ − ∆˜)}. Using {|A(bk, ck)| ≥
(γ− 1)(∆− ∆˜)}∩Gk = Gk, we obtain (A.9) from (A.14).
Next, we show (A.10). First of all, we note that Gk is inde-
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pendent of Hik−1. Therefore,
P[Gk|H
i
k−1] = P[Gk]. (A.15)
To compute P[Gk], we note that t
i
kγ , t
i
kγ+1, . . . , t
i
(k+1)γ−2
are independent, and thus, the events Fkγ , Fkγ+1, · · · ,
F(k+1)γ−2 are also independent. As a result,
P[Gk] = P[Fkγ ∩ Fkγ+1 ∩ · · · ∩ F(k+1)γ−2]
= P[Fkγ ] · · ·P[F(k+1)γ−2] =
( ∆˜
∆
)γ−1
= qγ−1. (A.16)
Hence, (A.10) follows from (A.15) and (A.16). Finally, we
use (A.8)–(A.10) to obtain (A.2), leading us to (40). 
B Proof of Lemma 4.5
We show (42) by induction. First, we consider the case where
N = 1. In this case, we obtain
P[∩N−1k=0 {ϕˆ
i
k = ϕk+1}]
= P[ϕˆi0 = ϕ1] = P[ϕˆ
i
0 = 1]ϕ1 + P[ϕˆ
i
0 = 0](1− ϕ1)
≤ ϕ1 + P[ϕˆ
i
0 = 0](1− ϕ1). (B.1)
By Lemma 4.4, we have P[ϕˆi0 = 0|H
i
−1] = 1 − P[ϕˆ
i
0 =
1|Hi−1] ≤ 1 − 2q
γ . Hence, P[ϕˆi0 = 0] = E[P[ϕˆ
i
0 =
0|Hi−1]] = E[1−P[ϕˆ
i
0 = 1|H
i
−1]] ≤ E[1− 2q
γ ] = 1− 2qγ.
As a result, ϕ1+P[ϕˆ
i
0 = 0](1−ϕ1) ≤ ϕ1+ (1− 2q
γ)(1−
ϕ1) = 1− 2q
γ(1 − ϕ1). Thus, we have (42) for N = 1.
Next, assume (42) holds for N = N˜ > 2, that is
P[
N˜−1⋂
k=0
{ϕˆik = ϕk+1}] ≤
N˜∏
j=1
(
1− 2qγ(1− ϕj)
)
. (B.2)
We will show that (42) holds for N = N˜ + 1. Observe
P
[ N˜⋂
k=0
{ϕˆik = ϕk+1}
]
= E
[ N˜∏
k=0
1[ϕˆik = ϕk+1]
]
= E
[ N˜∏
k=0
1[ϕˆik = ϕk+1]|H
i
N˜−1
]
. (B.3)
Since the random variables ϕˆik, k ∈ {0, . . . , N˜ − 1}, are
Hi
N˜−1
-measurable, from (B.3), we obtain
P
[ N˜⋂
k=0
{ϕˆik = ϕk+1}
]
= E
[( N˜−1∏
k=0
1[ϕˆik = ϕk+1]
)
· E
[
1[ϕˆi
N˜
= ϕN˜+1]|H
i
N˜−1
]]
. (B.4)
By Lemma 4.4, we have P[ϕˆi
N˜
= 0|Hi
N˜−1
] = 1− P[ϕˆi
N˜
=
1|Hi−1] ≤ 1− 2q
γ . Thus,
E
[
1
[
ϕˆi
N˜
= ϕN˜+1
]
|Hi
N˜−1
]
= P[ϕˆi
N˜
= ϕN˜+1|H
i
N˜−1
]
= P[ϕˆi
N˜
= 1|Hi
N˜−1
]ϕN˜+1
+ P[ϕˆi
N˜
= 0|Hi
N˜−1
](1− ϕN˜+1)
≤ ϕN˜+1 + (1 − 2q
γ)(1− ϕN˜+1)
= 1− 2qγ(1− ϕN˜+1). (B.5)
It then follows from (B.4) and (B.5) that
P
[ N˜⋂
k=0
{ϕˆik = ϕk+1}
]
≤ E
[( N˜−1∏
k=0
1
[
ϕˆik = ϕk+1
] )(
1− 2qγ(1− ϕN˜+1)
)]
= E
[ N˜−1∏
k=0
1
[
ϕˆik = ϕk+1
] ](
1− 2qγ(1 − ϕN˜+1)
)
= P
[ N˜−1⋂
k=0
{ϕˆik = ϕk+1}
](
1− 2qγ(1 − ϕN˜+1)
)
. (B.6)
Finally, by using (B.2) and (B.6), we obtain (42) with N =
N˜ + 1, which completes the proof. 
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